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Abstract:  David Friedrich Strauss is best known for his mythical 
interpretation  of  the  Gospel  narratives.  He  opposed  both  the 
supernaturalists (who regarded the Gospel stories as reliable) and 
the  rationalists  (who  offered  natural  explanations  of  purportedly 
supernatural  events).  His  mythical  interpretation  suggests  that 
many  of  the  stories  about  Jesus  were  woven  out  of  pre-existing 
messianic  beliefs  and  expectations.  Picking  up  this  suggestion,  I 
argue that the Gospel writers thought paradigmatically rather than 
historically. A paradigmatic explanation assimilates the event-to-be-
explained to what is thought to be a prototypical instance of divine 
action. It differs from a historical or scientific explanation insofar as 
it does not specify the conditions under which it should be applied. It 
is, therefore, a wonderfully flexible way to understand the present in 
the light of the past.
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The essential nature of myth is that it serves as a precedent, and  
every  precedent  contains  an  element  of  explanation,  for  it  is  
aprototype  for  subsequent  cases.  But  a  precedent  is  not  an  
explanation in the scientific sense... (Bronislaw Malinowski)
Introduction
Whatever  else  religions  may  do,  they  often  purport  to  offer 
explanations of the way the world is. In the words of some recent 
writers,
causal explanation is a hallmark of religion. Around the world, in 
all periods of recorded history, scripture and theologies have told 
how the universe was created, why humans occupy a special place 
in  the  scheme  of  things,  why  seasonal  changes  and  natural 
disasters occur, why some people triumph while others fail, and 
why everyone must occasionally suffer and eventually die.1
To recognise this fact is not to argue that religions arose from a need 
to  explain  the  world,  an  idea  characteristic  of  the  intellectualist 
theories of religion put forward by (for example) E. B. Tylor in the 
nineteenth century and Robin Horton in the twentieth. It is merely 
to note that, however religious representations first arose, one of the 
purposes to  which they are put is  an attempt to explain the way 
things are. To a student of the biblical literature, of course, this will 
come  as  no  surprise.  To  take  only  a  few examples,  the  prophets 
attempt to explain why the tragedy of the Babylonian Exile befell 
Israel, Matthew and Luke set out to explain how Jesus came to be 
born, and early Christian writers attempt to explain how his tomb 
came to be found empty and his followers convinced he was alive.
In what ways do religions attempt to explain states of affairs or 
events? How do these religious explanations differ from those offered 
in history and the sciences? These are the questions that have been 
1 Bernard  Spilka,  Phillip  Shaver  and  Lee  A.  Kirkpatrick,  “A  General 
Attribution  Theory  for  the  Psychology  of  Religion,”  Journal  for  the  
Scientific Study of Religion 24 (1985), 1.
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the focus of my recent research. In this course of this enquiry, I have 
found it useful to return to the work of David Friedrich Strauss. Of 
course,  the  questions  I  am trying  to  answer  are  not  those  being 
asked by Strauss. But it is the mark of a classic thinker that his 
work  will  shed  light  on  issues  that  lie  beyond  his  immediate 
concerns. What I am doing here is examining a particular form of 
purported explanation which is very common in religious contexts, 
and which was first identified by Strauss in the course of his work on 
the Gospels.
The Gospels and Myth
David  Friedrich  Strauss  became notorious  for  his  championing  of 
what he called the “mythical” interpretation of the Gospels. Strauss 
does  not  deny  that  there  exists  a  core  of  historically-reliable 
reportage within the Gospels. Indeed his second  Life of Jesus, first 
published in 1864, devotes one half of its first volume to what he 
calls a “historical outline of the life of Jesus.” However, Strauss also 
argued that much of the Gospel narrative could only be understood 
as either legend or (more commonly) as myth. Now the problem with 
the term “myth” is that it has been used in such a variety of senses. 
So it  will  be important to spell out just  how Strauss is using the 
term. In the formation of the mythological parts of the Gospels, he 
suggests, there were two processes at work.2 The first involved the 
creation  of  stories  about  Jesus  by  way  of  the  transfer  to  him of 
Jewish  Messianic  expectations.  Clear  examples  of  this  kind  of 
evangelical  myth  are  to  be  found  in  the  infancy  narratives  of 
Matthew and Luke. For instance, the prophecy of Balaam in Num 
24:17 has contributed to the creation of the story of the star that 
guided the magi in Matt 2:1-12.3 (Strauss notes that the creation of 
2 David Friedrich Strauss,  A New Life of Jesus (1864; London: Williams & 
Norgate, 1865), 1: 213.
3 David Friedrich Strauss,  The Life of Jesus Critically Examined translated 
by George Eliot  (1840; Ramsey, NJ: Sigler Press, 1994), 174.
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this story may precede the writing of the Gospel of Matthew: the first 
evangelist  may  simply  have  taken  it  over  from  early  Christian 
tradition.4) We may assume that the evangelists created such stories 
without any conscious intention to deceive.5 They truly believed they 
were  recounting  facts  about  Jesus,  although  they  came  to  this 
conclusion  in  a  way  which  seems  to  us  uncritical  and  question-
begging.  How might  the  evangelists  and  their  communities  have 
reasoned?  By  a  very  simple  process,  Strauss  argues.  They  would 
have  thought,  “such and such things  must  have  happened to  the 
Messiah;  Jesus  was  the  Messiah;  therefore  such  and such  things 
happened to him.”6
The second process lying behind the formation of evangelical myth 
involved a much more self-conscious kind of authorship.7 Here we 
may assume that the evangelists carefully crafted accounts to give 
expression to particular theological ideas. For Strauss, the Gospel of 
John offers the best examples of this style of myth. When creating 
the  conversation between Jesus  and the Samaritan woman (John 
4:7-30), Strauss writes, “the author of the fourth Gospel must have 
been as much conscious that he was inventing freely, as Homer when 
he  described  the  interview  between  …  Achilles  and  his  divine 
mother.”8 Nonetheless,  in doing so the evangelist  believed he was 
transmitting  a  truth  about  Jesus.  What  kind  of  truth  did  the 
evangelist believe he was transmitting? Strauss’s discussion offers 
no  clear  answer to this  question.  He does  say that  the truth the 
evangelist had in mind “was not literal truth,  or recounting what 
had really taken place, but the full and complete expression of the 
4 Strauss, The Life of Jesus, 177.
5 Strauss, The Life of Jesus, 81; A New Life of Jesus, 1: 207.
6 Strauss, The Life of Jesus, 84.
7 In his second work on Jesus, Strauss allows “more room than before to the 
hypothesis of conscious and intentional fiction” (A New Life of Jesus 1: 213), 
but  defends the use  of  the  term “myth” for  the product  of  even such a 
process.
8 Strauss, A New Life of Jesus, 1: 208.
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idea.”9 But  the  evangelist  gave  expression  to  this  idea  by 
“project[ing]  the  figures  of  his  mind  not,  like  [the  author  of  the 
Apocalypse] on the thunder clouds of the future, but on the steady 
wall of the past.”10 This suggests that the evangelist was writing an 
account which he wished his readers to understand as a report of 
actual events, even if he were conscious of their fictive quality.
This second description of what the evangelists were doing raises 
some difficult questions. Both in this context and elsewhere, Strauss 
indicates that he does not wish to convict the evangelists of fraud; he 
does not want to suggest that they were setting out to deceive.11 But 
on his second account it is far from clear how this accusation can be 
avoided. However, I will  not pursue this question here.12 It  is the 
first process identified by Strauss upon which I wish to focus. Here, I 
believe, Strauss has here arrived at an important insight about a 
common  form  of  religious  thought.13 This  first  process,  you  will 
recall,  consists  in  the  transfer  to  Jesus  of  Jewish  Messianic 
expectations. Sometimes this transfer has resulted in the creation of 
new stories about Jesus, stories which would be “mythical” in the 
sense in which Strauss uses the term. But even where this has not 
9 Ibid.,1: 209.
10 Ibid., 1: 209–10.
11 David Friedrich Strauss,  “Hermann Samuel  Reimarus and His Apology” 
(1877) §§ 38-40 translated by Ralph S. Frazer, Reimarus: Fragments edited 
by Charles H. Talbot; Lives of Jesus Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1970), 44–45.
12 For  some  reflections  on  these  issues,  see  Ulrich  Luz,  “Fiktivität  und 
Traditionstreue im Matthäusevangelium  im Lichte griechischer Literatur” 
Zeitschrift für die neutestamentlische Wissenschaft 84 (1993), 153–77.
13 Note, for instance, the close correspondence between Strauss’s account of 
the creation of the infancy narratives and Raymond Brown’s account (see 
The Birth of the Messiah Updated Edition [New York: Doubleday, 1993]). 
Brown carefully  avoids the term “myth,”  which he  regards as unhelpful 
(ibid., 580). He also assumes that the evangelists’ theological claims remain 
valid, even when the narratives which support them are recognized to be 
largely fictional. Strauss, of course, was not so sanguine.
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occurred,  even  where  the  evangelists  have  drawn  in  existing 
traditions about Jesus, those traditions are reshaped in the light of 
themes  and  expectations  drawn  from  the  canonical  and  non-
canonical traditions of Israel. If we take, for instance, the passion 
narratives,  it  does  seem  that  these  are  based  on  a  pre-existing 
Christian tradition which contains a core of historical fact.14 But as 
Raymond Brown notes, 
the first followers of Jesus would have known many things about 
crucifixion in general and almost surely some of the details about 
Jesus’  crucifixion,  e.g.,  what  kind  of  cross  was  employed. 
Nevertheless, what is preserved in the narrative is mostly what 
echoes Scripture (division of garments, offering of vinegary wine, 
final words of Jesus).15
What interests me about this process is that it reflects a form of 
explanation  (or,  if  you  prefer,  interpretation)  widely  found  in 
religious contexts, which I have called paradigmatic explanation.16 I 
would like to examine this phenomenon more closely and offer a few 
reflections on its relationship to historical explanation.17
14 Raymond  E.  Brown,  The  Death  of  the  Messiah  Anchor  Bible  Reference 
Library (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 15–16, 51.
15 Ibid., 15.
16 The name owes something to Jacob Neusner’s discussion of paradigmatic 
thought  (see  his  The  Presence  of  the  Past,  the  Pastness  of  the  Present:  
History,  Time and Paradigm in Rabbinic Judaism [Bethesda, MD: CDL 
Press, 1996], summarised in his “Paradigmatic versus Historical Thinking: 
The  Case  of  Rabbinic  Judaism”  History  and  Theory:  Studies  in  the  
Philosophy  of  History  36  [1997],  353–77),  although  what  he  calls 
paradigmatic  thinking  represents  a  subset  of  the  style  of  interpretation 
that I am describing. Note that my use of the term is not related to Thomas 
Kuhn’s famous (but sometimes misleading)  discussion of “paradigms” in 
the history of science.
17 As  the  epigraph to  this  paper  suggests,  my description of  paradigmatic 
explanations owes something to Bronislaw Malinowski’s account of the role 
of  myth in preliterate societies.  See,  for  instance,  his  Myth in Primitive  
Psychology Psyche Miniatures  (London:  Kegan Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  & 
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Paradigmatic Explanation
Before  I  go  further,  let  me  offer  a  few  comments  about  the 
relationship  between  explanation  and  interpretation.  Throughout 
this paper, I will  be referring to paradigmatic explanation, but in 
this  context  the  term explanation  could  be  replaced  by  the  term 
interpretation. To explain an event religiously is to interpret it as a 
particular  kind  of  divine  action,  in  much  the  same  way  that  we 
interpret the actions of our fellow human beings. Why is this? A key 
idea  here  is  that  of  the  ubiquity  of  divine  action.  For  classical 
Christian theism, God is thought of as directly or indirectly the cause 
of every event and of every feature of the world. This view is clearly 
set out in the writings of Thomas Aquinas,18 although it is, of course, 
much older. Indeed the great medieval theologian goes so far as to 
argue that God is responsible even for sinful actions, insofar as they 
are actions, although he does try to distance God from their sinful 
character.19 From this point of view, if the theist were asked of any 
event, “Why did this happen?”, she could simply reply “Because God 
willed it.” But since this same answer could be given in any context, 
in response to a query regarding any event, it would be (from the 
theist’s perspective) true but trivial. It would tell us nothing that we 
did not already know. Of course, a distinction must be made between 
those events in which God is seen as acting by way of  secondary 
causes,  and those  events which he is  believed to  produce directly 
(miracles).  But  this  distinction  notwithstanding,20 if  a  religious 
Co.,  1926),  38–39.  Malinowski  himself  notes  that  biblical  stories  play  a 
parallel role in the life of the Christian (ibid., 21). 
18 Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa theologiae 1a  105.5;  De potentia  3.7;  Summa 
contra gentiles 3.67.
19 Aquinas, De malo 3.2.
20 An intentional explanation is also required if one is to identify an alleged 
miracle,  for  such  an  event  must  be  consistent  with  the  character  and 
purposes of God. This fact was first noted by John Stuart Mill (A System of 
Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles  
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explanation is  to  be  informative,  it  will  set  out what it  is  God is 
intending to achieve by acting as he has. A religious explanation, in 
other  words,  will  need  to  take  the  form  of an  “intentional 
explanation,” in which one interprets an action as the expression of a 
particular purpose in the one acting.21
What  I  am  calling  “paradigms”  are  prototypical  instances  of  
particular kinds of  divine  action.  When applied to an event to  be 
explained, they represent one way in which the believer can identify 
what it is God is doing in this new context. There are two types of 
paradigms that I can detect within the biblical tradition.22 The first 
consists of descriptions of events that were thought of as still to be 
enacted (classically prophecies and apocalyptic visions). When these 
descriptions of divine action are used paradigmatically, it is by way 
of  a claimed  identification of  the  events to  be  explained with the 
predicted events. What was to be enacted by God, it is claimed, has 
now been brought about. Matthew’s Gospel, for example, frequently 
describes events in the life of Jesus as the fulfilment of prophecy. 
The virginal conception of Jesus (Matt 1:22) is the fulfilment of Isa 
of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation in Collected Works, 
edited by J. M. Robson [University of Toronto Press, 1973] 7: 626) and more 
recently by Douglas Erlandson (1977. “A New Look at Miracles.” Religious 
Studies  13  [1977],  423–24)  and  James  Keller  (“Contemporary  Christian 
Doubts About the Resurrection” Faith and Philosophy 5:1 [Jan.1988], 51).
21 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 
19–20.
22 The distinction I am making may well be one the evangelists would never 
have bothered to make. In Matthew’s mind, is the virginal conception of 
Jesus (Matt 1:23) the immediate fulfilment of the prophecy of Isa 7:14 (my 
first  category) or  an  indirect  fulfilment  by  way  of  a  typological 
correspondence  between events  of  Isaiah’s  time and those  of  Jesus’  (my 
second category)? Presumably the former, but as Leonhard Goppelt writes 
(Typos:  The  Typological  Interpretation  of  the  Old Testament  in  the  New 
[1939]  translated  by  Donald  H.  Madvig  [Grand  Rapids,  MI:  Eerdmans, 
1982], 103) “we cannot ask” the evangelists “ this pointed question. Their 
only concern is that these statements … were fulfilled in Jesus’ experience.”
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7:14, the slaughter of the baby boys by King Herod (Matt 2:15) fulfils 
Jer 31:15, the return of the infant from Egypt (Matt 2:17) fulfils Hos 
11:1, and so on. In a parallel manner, all four Gospels present the 
events following the death of Jesus as an enactment of the first stage 
of the end-time scenario spoken of in the apocalyptic writings of late 
second-Temple Judaism. As we will see later, to show the credibility 
of the former, you must show the credibility of the latter. If Albert 
Schweitzer was right,  Jesus himself  may have seen his imminent 
death as falling into the pattern of end-time suffering spoken of in 
that same apocalyptic tradition. (The first paradigmatic interpreter 
of the life of Jesus was probably Jesus himself.)
The second, more common type of paradigm is an event that is 
thought of as having already taken place. In the biblical tradition, 
these  are  the  events  of  the  Old  Testament  to  which  the  New 
Testament  writers  refer.  One  thinks,  for  instance,  of  the 
identification of the bronze serpent lifted up by Moses (Num 21:9) 
with the crucified Jesus in John 3:14-15 or the identification of the 
water-giving rock of the Exodus account with Jesus in 1 Cor 10:4. 
But of course the same form of explanation and interpretation may 
be  found  within  the  Old  Testament  itself.  Here  one  thinks,  for 
instance, of  Deutero-Isaiah’s description of the return from Exile, 
cast in the pattern of the events of the Exodus. These form the types 
or  figures so  familiar  to  students  of  the  New  Testament  and  of 
patristic and medieval biblical interpretation (and so influential in 
the history of European art and literature).23  As Northrop Frye has 
reminded us, if there is anything distinctive about the literary form 
of  the  Christian  Bible,  it  is  this  typological  structure.24 But 
paradigmatic  interpretation  is  also  common  outside  the  biblical 
tradition. For instance, it plays a major role in the shaping of the 
23 Erich  Auerbach,  “Figura”  (1941)  translated  by  Ralph  Manheim  Scenes.  
from  the  Drama  of  European  Literature (Gloucester,  MA:  Peter  Smith, 
1973), 11–76.
24 Northrop Frye,  The  Great  Code:  the  Bible  and Literature (London:  Ark, 
1983), 79–80.
9
DAWES, Paradigmatic Explanations
Qur(an,  where  events  in  the  life  of Muhammad  (for  instance)  are 
understood by reference to the paradigmatic instance of Abraham.25 In the 
broader  world  of  magico-religious  thought,  we  may  also  speak  of 
minor  paradigms,  the  stories  told  by  believers  to  one  another  of 
successful  instances  of  prayer  or,  in  different  contexts,  successful 
magical spells.26 While these have lesser authority than the great 
communal paradigms, they play an important role in allowing people 
to understand new experiences religiously.27 
Where a past event functions paradigmatically by being applied to 
a  new  situation,  the  result  is  a  form  of  (explicit  or  implicit) 
metaphorical  identification.  In  his  study  of  symbolism, 
anthropologist  Dan  Sperber  has  spelt  out  the  cognitive  processes 
that are thereby set in train.28 Since the implicit identification (such 
as  “Jesus  is  Moses”)  is  literally  (and  obviously)  false,  this 
identification  sets  in  motion  what  Sperber  calls  a  “symbolic 
mechanism” in the mind. As hearers or readers we try to make sense 
25 See Gregory W. Dawes, “The Sense of the Past in the New Testament and 
the  Qur’an”  in  Islamic  and  Christian  Cultures:  Conflict  or  Dialogue? 
Bulgarian  Philosophical  Studies  III  edited  by  Plamen  Makariev 
(Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values & Philosophy, 2001), 9-
31,  available  online  at  http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-
21/chapter_i.htm
26 On the “everyday myths” which surround magic (even in societies that lack 
the grand myths that so interested Malinowski), see E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 
“The Morphology and Function of Magic: A Comparative Study of Trobriand 
and Zande Ritual and Spells” American Anthropologist 31 (1929), 629–30.
27 A  myth,  at  least  in  Strauss’s  first  sense  of  this  term,  is  simply  a 
paradigmatic  interpretation  of  a  particular  event  (such  as  the  birth  of 
Jesus), which gives rise to the creation of stories about that event (such as 
that of the magi).
28 Dan Sperber,  Rethinking Symbolism (1974) translated by Alice L. Morton; 
Cambridge  Studies  and  Papers  in  Social  Anthropology  11  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press / Paris: Hermann, 1975), 115–49. For a more 
concise description, see Pascal Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A  
Cognitive  Theory  of  Religion (Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press, 
1994), 56–57.
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of  the  apparently  false  statement  by  searching  for  relevant 
analogies. Relevant analogies are generally not difficult to find. This 
is  one  of  the  factors  which  gives  rise  to  the  peculiar  fertility  of 
religious  thought,  its  ability  to  produce  apparently  endless 
interpretations of  the same paradigmatic event.  The paradigmatic 
event itself as has many interpretations as there exist situations to 
which it might be applied. Once it is applied to a particular situation, 
the number of resemblance that may be found is limited only by the 
imagination of the interpreter. It follows that there is no end to the 
process  of  interpreting  paradigmatic  explanations,  short  of 
exhaustion on the part of the interpreter or audience.
Paradigmatic explanations are not limited to religious contexts. 
Secular examples abound, particularly in everyday parlance. “Iraq is 
America’s next Vietnam” would be a contemporary instance.29 Here 
the events of the Vietnam war (or at least a particular interpretation 
of  those  events)  function  as  a  lens  through  which  one  views  the 
involvement  of  the  United  States  in  Iraq.  The  metaphorical 
identification of the two situations invites the hearer to search for 
resemblances. Indeed there is a sense in use of the paradigm creates 
the very resemblances of which it claims to speak, insofar as it sets 
the hearer’s imagination to work to discover analogies. (Of course, 
the  fact  that  a  suitably  disposed  hearer  will  probably  find  such 
analogies  does  not  mean  that  the  paradigm  is  necessarily 
illuminating.) It is not hard to see that paradigmatic interpretation 
will be a wondrously flexible device, particularly in the hand of an 
imaginative  interpreter.  Cognitively  speaking,  we  may  say  that 
religious traditions survive on the indeterminacy of their paradigms 
and the flexibility of their modes of interpretation. 
29 I am indebted to Andrew Rutherford, an Honours student at the University 
of Otago, for this example. Some months after I wrote this, on the 6 April 
2004, Senator Edward Kennedy employed this paradigm, stating that “Iraq 
has become George Bush’s Vietnam.”
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This flexibility is all the greater when one takes into account the 
process  of  accommodation  and  assimilation  that  typically 
accompanies the application of a paradigm. I have already noted that 
in the Qur’an the events of Muhammad’s life are interpreted in the 
light of the paradigmatic life of Abraham. But it is important to note 
that the Qur’an’s account of the life of Abraham (along with the lives 
of the other prophets) is itself reshaped in the light of the experience 
of Muhammad.30 In the formation of the Gospels this process can also 
be seen at work. On the one hand, the events of Jesus’ life are re-
described so as to allow for their paradigmatic interpretation. Mark’s 
description of Jesus in the wilderness (Mark 1:13) seems crafted to 
call  to  mind  what  we  regard  as  non-canonical  Jewish  traditions 
regarding  Adam.31 The  story  of  the  stranger  driving  out  demons 
(Mark  9:38–40),  seems  worded  so  as  to  call  to  mind  its  Old 
Testament  parallel  (Num 11:26–30).32  Similarly,  in  the  entry  to 
Jerusalem,  Matthew  has  provided  a  second  animal  (Matt  21:7, 
compare  Mark  11:7),  so  that  his  account  will  be  a  more  literal 
fulfilment of Zech 9:9.33 On the other hand (but less commonly), the 
Old  Testament  passages  which  function  paradigmatically  are 
sometimes  reshaped  to  highlight  their  application  to  Jesus.  In 
defending the conduct of his disciples picking grain on the Sabbath 
(Mark 2:23-28), Jesus redescribes what David does in 1 Sam 21:1–6, 
so as to accommodate the Old Testament story to the situation at 
hand.34 (Whether Jesus himself did this, or the evangelist, is of little 
significance  here:  both  were  presumably  capable  of  thinking 
paradigmatically.)  The  alleged  biblical  citation  in  Matt  2:23  (“He 
shall be called a Nazorean”) does not correspond to any single Old 
Testament verse, but seems to be a free combination of Isa 4:3 and 
30 Dawes, “The Sense of the Past,” 18-19.
31 Goppelt, Typos, 98-99.
32 Ibid., 76.
33 Ibid., 87.
34 Ibid., 85.
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Judg 16:17.35 Similarly, the scripture citation in John 19:36 (“Not a 
bone of his shall be broken”) seems to be an adaptation of Ps 34:20, 
perhaps in the light of Exod 12:46 and/or Num 9:12.36
It  would  be  interesting  to  take this  discussion of  paradigmatic 
explanations  further  by  comparing  them  with  other  forms  of 
explanation.  But  this  is  to  enter  an  area  of  lively  philosophical 
debate.  I  will  take  the risk  of  making  just  one  suggestion.  Many 
forms of explanation — such as those involving scientific theories — 
depend on some kind of general statement about the natural world 
or the behaviour of human beings. I am not saying that the general 
statement in question need be  a  “law” in the strict  sense of  that 
term.  (Some  would  argue  that  it  could  be  a  mere  accidental 
generalization.37) Nor am I saying that all explanations are deductive 
in  form,  with  a  general  statement  as  the  major  premise  and the 
explanandum as the conclusion.38 (The role played by generalizations 
may vary from one type of explanation to another.) What I am saying 
is that many forms of explanation appeal to theories which employ 
statements of the form “all As are F,” where A is a type of individual 
or event and F is some feature that may be predicated of it. 
This is particularly important in the sciences. A scientific theory 
would not be testable unless it applied to more than one instance and 
unless it spelt out the class of instances to which it is applicable. It is 
a much debated issue whether historical explanations — which are 
typically  narratives of  particular  events  — also  involve  appeal  to 
law-like generalizations.  On some occasions they clearly  do.39 The 
35 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 223–25.
36 For a discussion, see Brown,  The Death of the Messiah,  1185–86. Brown 
regards the Exodus and Numbers citations as the primary reference.
37 Marc Lange, Natural Laws in Scientific Practice (Oxford University Press, 
2000) 268–71.
38 This  is  the  famous  “deductive-nomological”  model  of  explanation  first 
espoused  by  Carl  G.  Hempel  (“Studies  in  the  Logic  of  Explanation” 
Philosophy of Science 15 [1948] 135–75).
39 Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge Morningside Edition (Columbia 
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appeal may be explicit, as is the case when historians make use of 
social-scientific theories, or it may be implicit, as when a historical 
explanation  depends  on  some  common-sense  generalization  about 
human behaviour. Some would argue that intentional explanations 
— where we explain an action by spelling out the reasons why the 
agent  acted  as  she  did  —  are  an  exception  to  this  rule.40 Since 
historical  explanations  take  many  forms,  there  may  be  other 
exceptions. But they need not concern us here.
What about paradigmatic explanations? It is true that insofar as a 
paradigm embodies a pattern that can be reapplied in new contexts, 
it does resemble a general statement. But what makes a paradigm 
different from a theoretical statement is that  it does not specify its  
context  of  application.  Nineteenth-century African Americans may 
have understood their experience against the backdrop of the Exodus 
events, but there is nothing about the biblical story of the Exodus 
that demands this application. Exodus simply speaks of a particular 
set of events: it makes no claim that other instances of slavery will 
follow  this  pattern.  Indeed  the  Bible  makes  very  few  general 
statements of this sort.  In general — here we must recognize the 
complexity  of  the  Hebrew  Bible,  which  includes  the  Wisdom 
literature — the Bible relates a very particular history. It is the later 
biblical writers (such as the evangelists) and Jewish and Christian 
interpreters who take the events of this history as paradigmatic. In 
other words, the biblical paradigms are not designed as paradigms; 
they are simply used this way. It follows that the biblical paradigms 
University Press, 1985), chap. 10.  Narration and Knowledge is a revised 
version of Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of History (1965).
40 Contemporary discussion of these issues takes as its starting-point Donald 
Davidson’s 1963 article “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” (Essays on Actions 
and Events [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], 3–19). Davidson argues that 
reasons are causes and that intentional actions must therefore be covered 
by causal laws. However, an identification of the causal laws involved may 
require a redescription of the action.  It is therefore “an error to think that 
no explanation has been given until a law has been produced” (ibid., 17).
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are patterns that are always available, but never compulsory.41 In 
practice,  particular  religious  communities  will  apply  these 
paradigms only to a very specific  set of events.  Other events that 
could be interpreted paradigmatically are not treated in this way. 
Christian  interpreters,  for  instance,  would  be  unlikely  to  use  the 
biblical  account  of  Moses  to  interpret  the  life  of  Muhammad, 
although it is not difficult to see how this might be done.
Why Does It Matter?
Why is this important? What purpose is served by identifying and 
giving a name to this particular style of religious explanation (or, if 
you prefer, religious interpretation)? Well,  one reason for doing so 
that it  helps us to understand why there  exists a historical Jesus 
question.  Why  do  modern  historical  accounts  of  the  life  of  Jesus 
differ  so  profoundly from the accounts offered by the evangelists? 
Much ink has been spilt on the nature of historical explanation, and 
insofar as historical explanations embrace intentional explanations, 
that discussion is far from ended. But less attention has been paid to 
the  structure of  religious explanations,  which are also  intentional 
explanations,  but  which  are  grounded  quite  differently  from 
explanations  in  history or  the  social  sciences.  It  was  to  Strauss’s 
credit  that  he  not  only  offered  a  particular  interpretation  of  the 
Gospels; in doing so he grasped at least one of the distinctive ways in 
which the evangelists interpreted the life of Jesus. 
The  significance  of  these  reflections  may  be  illustrated  by 
examining the work of a contemporary theologian in whose writings 
paradigmatic  and  historical  explanations  are  confused.  That 
theologian is Wolfhart Pannenberg. As is well known, Pannenberg is 
reacting against the apparent fideism of those schools of  theology 
inspired by Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann. He insists that the 
facts on which Christian faith is based must be (in principle, at least) 
41 For similar remarks about typology, see Goppelt, Typos, 221, 232.
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accessible  to  all.42 Divine  revelation  is  not  a  kind  of  mystery, 
accessible only to believers. In Pannenberg’s view, this idea would 
represent  a  kind  of  gnostic  heresy.  If  Christian  faith  is  to  be  a 
rational choice, it must be based on the events whose existence and 
character  can  be  demonstrated  independently  of  that  faith.  This 
principle must apply to the resurrection of Jesus, which plays a key 
role in Pannenberg’s theology.43 This,  then, is the challenge which 
Pannenberg  sets  himself,  to  demonstrate  that  the  resurrection  of 
Jesus is a historically demonstrable event.44 I do not want to enter 
into the details of his discussion here: I have done so elsewhere.45 All 
I  want  to  note  is  the  role  played  by  paradigmatic  thinking  in 
Pannenberg’s argument.
On  the  face  of  it,  the  task  Pannenberg  sets  himself  seems 
hopeless. In reconstructing a past event (or in judging the reliability 
of his source), a historian would normally ask: “What kinds of events 
normally  occur  in  similar  circumstances?”  He  would,  as  Ernst 
Troeltsch reminds us, employ some kind of reasoning by analogy.46 
But  remember  that  the  resurrection  of  Jesus,  if  it  were  to  have 
occurred, would have been a singular event. An event of this type 
would never have happened before (cf. 1 Cor 15:20) and it has never 
happened again. (I am assuming here that the New Testament is not 
42 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation” in 
Revelation as History edited by Wolfhart Pannenberg (1961) translated by 
David Granskou (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 135.
43 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus – God and Man (1964) translated by Lewis L. 
Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (London: SCM, 1968), 109.
44 There  are  some  indications  that  in  his  later  work  Pannenberg  has 
weakened this  claim,  as I  have noted elsewhere;  see my  The Historical 
Jesus Question: The Challenge of History to Religious Authority (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 336. But it is Pannenberg’s earlier and 
stronger claims that I am evaluating here.
45 Dawes, The Historical Jesus Question, 332–41.
46 Ernst Troeltsch, “Historical and Dogmatic Method in Theology” (1898) in 
The Historical Jesus Quest: A Foundational Anthology edited by Gregory W. 
Dawes (Leiden: Deo, 1999), 32–33.
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speaking of the mere resuscitation of a corpse.) The historian must 
therefore make a judgement of probability. Here is a report of an 
event  which,  if  it  actually  occurred,  would  run  counter  to  our 
otherwise  uniform experience  of  the  world.  Which is  more likely? 
That the reported event did occur, or that those reporting it were 
deceiving or deceived?  This judgement will be informed by the fact 
that we do have ample evidence of self-deception and of the growth of 
mythology in religious contexts.47 
This is  a familiar argument, first  put forward by David Hume. 
But  if  it  is  applicable  to  any  report  of  a  miracle,  it  is  surely 
applicable  to  the  reports  concerning  resurrection.48 Implicitly, 
Pannenberg recognizes the difficulty, for he insists that belief in the 
resurrection of Jesus is plausible only if one accepts the apocalyptic 
vision  of  the  end-time  general  resurrection  of  the  dead.49 But  of 
course this is to reason paradigmatically. It is to interpret the events 
following  the  death  of  Jesus,  not  by  reference  to  any  general 
statements  about  the  way  things  occur,  but  by  reference  to  a 
predicted action of God which will occur (if at all) only at the end of 
time.
Nonetheless,  Pannenberg  does  not  abandon  his  quest  for  a 
rational  faith.  He  sets  out  to  demonstrate  the  truth  (his  term is 
“universal validity”50) of the apocalyptic vision. But how could one do 
this?  The  critical  thinker  —  who  proportions  his  belief  to  the 
47 Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical  
Knowledge and Christian Belief (1966; Urbana, IL:  University of Illinois 
Press, 1996), 88.
48 Whatever  the  role  played  by  law-like  generalizations  in  other  forms  of 
historical  explanation,  the  reports  of  Jesus’  resurrection  must  face  this 
objection, that they are contradicted by every other instance of death that 
we know of.
49 Pannenberg, “Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation,” 146; Jesus – 
God and Man, 81; Systematic Theology vol 2 (1991) translated by Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 348–9, 362.
50 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 2: 351.
17
DAWES, Paradigmatic Explanations
evidence — will  apply the same kind of  probabilistic  reasoning to 
predictions of a general resurrection as to reports of the resurrection 
of  Jesus.  After  a  few   attempts  to  render  the  apocalyptic  vision 
plausible  (which  fall  far  short  of  demonstrating  its  truth),51 
Pannenberg appeals to the resurrection of Jesus in support of belief 
in the general resurrection.52 Needless to say, such circularity can 
prove  nothing.  What  has  Pannenberg  actually  demonstrated? 
Firstly, that belief in the resurrection can only be plausible to one 
who thinks paradigmatically; secondly, that appeal to this particular 
paradigm cannot be justified in a non-circular fashion.
This conclusion raises a question about the origins of resurrection 
belief. If the kind of probabilistic reasoning on which the historian 
must rely rules out belief in the general resurrection, how could that 
belief have become established in the first place? Here, of course, we 
can only speculate. All we can say with any degree of confidence is 
that a clear belief in the resurrection of the dead appears in Jewish 
literature only in the second-century b.c.e. One can only surmise — 
and this will offer us a final example of paradigmatic reasoning — 
that those who formulated this belief drew upon a number of widely-
accepted descriptions of divine action.53 These include the statement 
regarding national restoration found in Hosea 6:2 (“After two days 
he will revive us, on the third day he will raise us up. . .”), the vision 
of Ezekiel 37 (the valley of dry bones), and the psalm of thanksgiving 
attributed to Jonah (Jonah 2:2-9). It is from such accounts of divine 
action, treated as paradigms, that belief in the resurrection of the 
dead  could  develop.  The  development  of  this  belief  would  have 
51 Pannenberg, Jesus – God and Man, 85–88; Systematic Theology vol 3 (1993) 
translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 
539–43.
52 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 3: 544–45, 550, 593.
53 I am leaving aside the far more speculative suggestion that they drew upon 
non-Jewish myths regarding dying or rising gods or (less speculatively, but 
still  without  concrete  evidence)  that  they  were  dependent  upon Persian 
(Zoroastrian) eschatology.
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formed part  of  the  general  heightening  of  prophetic  thought  that 
gave  rise  to  the  apocalyptic  literature.  It  would  have  been  given 
particular impetus by the problem of martyrdom in the Maccabean 
period. The result of this process would have been the apocalyptic 
end-time scenario. It was this scenario which (as Pannenberg notes) 
the earliest Christian transferred to their visionary experiences to 
produce what Strauss would regard as the greatest of all Christian 
myths, that of the resurrection of Jesus.
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